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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff/Appellee : Case No. 900501-CA 
v. s 
REX PAUL TAYLOR, t Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions for possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (1990), and possession of marijuana without a tax 
stamp affixed, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-19-106(2) (Supp. 1990). This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 
1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Did the trial court properly admit, under rules 403 and 
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, facts of defendant's prior arrest 
to prove defendant's plan, knowledge, and identity? Evidentiary 
questions are reviewed on appeal under a correction of error 
standard; but, the trial court's subsidiary factual 
determinations will be given deference and reversed only if 
clearly erroneous. State v. Ramirez, No. 880425/ amended slip 
op. at 10-11 n.3 (Utah April 23, 1991). 
2. Did the trial court properly exercise its 
discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss based on a 
claim of insufficient evidence? A denial of a motion to dismiss 
for insufficient evidence will only be reviewed to determine if 
the state presented some evidence to establish each element of 
the crimes charged. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 
1989). 
3. Did the trial court properly conclude that 
defendant failed to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in a third-party's cabin such that he lacked standing to contest 
the validity of a search warrant for the cabin? 
Even if defendant had standing to contest the search, 
did the trial court properly conclude that based on the "totality 
of the circumstances," there existed probable cause for the 
issuance of the search warrant? The magistrate's probable cause 
determination will be upheld if a substantial basis exists for 
its finding based on the totality of the facts contained in the 
affidavit. State v. Babell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Collard, No. 900246-CA, slip. op. at 3 (Utah Ct. App. April 
22, 1991). 
4. Did the admission into evidence of defendant's 
prior "crimes, wrongs or acts" pursuant to rule 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence, violate defendant's fifth amendment rights 
under either the doctrine of collateral estoppel or double 
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jeopardy? This is a matter of law, reviewable on appeal under a 
correction of error standard. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 
788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990). 
5. Did the trial court properly admit into evidence the 
prior inconsistent statements of a witness under rule 801(d)(1), 
Utah Rules of Evidence? As an evidentiary matter, the court's 
ruling is reviewable on appeal under the standard enunciated in 
paragraph 1, above. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable statutes, constitutional provisions and rules 
for a determination of this case are, in pertinent part: 
U.S. Const, amend. V: 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice in double 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
Utah R. Evid. 103. Rulings on evidence: 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 
or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is 
one admitting evidence, a timely objection or 
motion to strike appears of record, stating 
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the specific ground of objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the 
context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling 
is one excluding evidence, the substance 
which shows the character of the evidence, 
the form in which it was offered, the 
objection made, and the ruling thereon. It 
may direct the making of an offer in question 
and answer form. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court 
may add any other or further statement which 
shows the character of the evidence, the form 
in which it was offered, the objection made, 
and the ruling thereon. It may direct the 
making of an offer in question and answer 
form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, 
proceedings shall be conducted, to the extend 
practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible 
evidence from being suggested to the jury by 
any means, such as making statements or 
offers of proof or asking questions in the 
hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule 
precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they 
were not brought to the attention of the 
court. 
Utah R. Evid 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time: 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 404. Character evidence not admissible 
to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(b) Other crimesr wrongs, or acts. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
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plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
Utah R. Evid. 801. Definitions: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A 
statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The 
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement and the statement is 
(A) inconsistent with his testimony or the 
witness denies having made the statement or 
has forgotten, or (B) consistent with his 
testimony and is offered to rebut an express 
or implied charge against him of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive, 
or (C) one of identification of a person made 
after perceiving him. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Rex Paul Taylor, was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (1990), and possession of marijuana without a tax 
stamp affixed, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-19-106(2) (Supp. 1990) (R. 1-3). On June 27 and 29, 
1990, a jury trial was held before the Honorable Boyd L. Park, 
Fourth Judicial District Court, Wasatch County, State of Utah (R. 
164-70). On June 29th, the jury returned guilty verdicts as 
charged (R. 179). On August 31, 1990, defendant was sentenced to 
concurrent statutory indeterminate terms of zero to five years in 
the Utah State Prison (R. 222-23). Defendant filed a notice of 
appeal on September 5, 1990 (R. 233). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In July, 1988, Gil Marchbanks purchased a mountain lot 
located in the Timberlakes area of Wasatch County, Utah 
(Suppression Hearing Transcript, hereafter referred to as S.T., 
at 18; Trial Transcript, hereafter referred to as T., at 116-18)• 
The next month, Marchbanks was granted permission to erect a 
vacation cabin on the lot (T. 120). He listed defendant, Rex 
Taylor, as the contractor (T. 120-21). The multi-level cabin was 
completed in the fall of 1988 (T. 42, 162). 
On May 11, 1989, a search warrant was executed on the 
Timberlakes cabin (T. 37). The cabin was fully furnished and 
contained numerous personal effects and clothing (T. 39, 43). 
Rounds of ammunition were on the window sills (T. 39). No one 
was found in the cabin. 
The police found two large locked safes in the basement. In 
the first safe, thirty-six (36) pounds of marijuana were found 
(T. 102). Approximately twenty (20) pounds of the marijuana were 
in a large bag marked with its weight (T. 102). The rest was 
packaged in one pound amounts in individual Ziploc bags (T. 104-
06). The other safe contained marijuana residue (T. 107). No 
Utah tax stamps were affixed to the marijuana (T. 110). 
In the utility room of the cabin, one opened and thirteen 
(13) unopened boxes of two (2) gallon Ziploc storage bags were 
found (T. 58-59). The Ziploc bags were identical to those used 
in packaging the individual one pound marijuana bags found in the 
basement safe (T. 106). A triple beam scale, commonly used in 
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measuring controlled substances, was found in the kitchen (T. 97-
98). Small amounts of marijuana and marijuana residue were found 
throughout the cabin (T. 68, 83, 87-88, 98). 
Numerous documents were found in the cabin. These included: 
1) a receipt made out to defendant for the purchase of 
$870.00 worth of furniture for the cabin (Exhibit 2; 
T.44); 
2) various receipts made out to defendant for the 
purchase of propane gas for the cabin, including one 
indicating that defendant had paid $2,200.00 in cash on 
the account (Exhibit 7; T. 59-60); 
3) various receipts made out to defendant related to 
the purchase of construction materials which indicated 
that when payments were made, cash was paid in the 
amounts of $550.00 and $1000.00 (Exhibit 10; T. 69-71); 
4) a 1988 Utah hunting license issued to defendant 
(Exhibit 8; T. 61); and, 
5) the 1989 Utah registration and decal stickers for 
two 1988 Yamaha snowmobiles issued to defendant, which 
registration matched in description two snowmobiles 
found in the basement of the cabin (Exhibit 9; T. 71-
7 2); and 
6) various documents relating to the purchase of the 
lot by Gil Marchbanks, including two receipts 
indicating that the closing costs of $3,123.77 and 
water hookup and excavation costs of $2250.00 had been 
paid in cash (Exhibits 5 and 6; T. 114-120). 
While some of the cabins in the Timberlakes area had year 
around access, this cabin did not. It was located on a dirt road 
which was not cleared in the winter months (T. 154, 157). 
Because of its relative isolation, other residents could not see 
when individuals were at the cabin (T. 159). However, two of the 
year-round residents, the Oteros, were familiar with Gil 
Marchbanks and defendant since Mr. Otero worked on the cabin as a 
subcontractor. Mrs. Otero thought that aside from their business 
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relationship that Marchbanks and defendant appeared to be friends 
(T. 156). In fact, defendant and Marchbanks were living together 
in Las Vegas, Nevada at the time (Exhibit 39 at 3). 
According to defendant's girlfriend, Vickie Tooke, 
defendant frequently used the cabin (T. 199). Prior to the 
search in May, defendant was last observed at the cabin in the 
fall of 1988. However, in December, 1988, defendant and Gil 
Marchbanks were seen at the gate to the Timberlakes area (T. 
162). 
Approximately one month prior to the search, around late 
March or early April, 1989, defendant called Anita Otero to ask 
her if the road to the cabin was accessible. She was unsure and 
told him to call her husband (T. 156-57). Defendant then called 
Tom Otero at work and asked if the road was passable to the cabin 
because defendant wanted to get his Jet Ski which was stored 
there. Mr. Otero told him that it was not yet passable (T. 164). 
Twelve days prior to the search of the cabin, a police 
narcotics team conducted surveillance of defendant in Utah County 
(T. 123-24). On April 29, 1989, the police observed defendant as 
he drove to various locations in Utah County and met with 
individuals for brief encounters. Throughout the surveillance, 
defendant drove a small pickup truck with an attached trailer. 
The trailer was carrying the same Jet Ski which defendant had 
previously told Tom Otero was stored at the Timberlakes cabin.1 
1
 Kevin Williams, a friend of defendant's, testified that 
defendant had called him around early March and asked if he would 
go to the cabin and get the Jet Ski. Williams claimed that he 
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The surveillance culminated in defendant's arrest for 
distribution of marijuana in Utah County. At the time of his 
arrest, defendant had in his possession fourteen pounds of 
marijuana, a ledger notebook which contained entries consistent 
with the distribution of marijuana in pound amounts/ and 
approximately $25,000.00 in small bills (T. 141, 149, 192).2 
The packaging of the marijuana found in defendant's 
possession on April 29th was identical to that found in the 
Timberlakes cabin on May 11th. In both cases, the marijuana was 
packaged in one pound amounts in two gallon Ziploc bags. In both 
cases, the individual marijuana packages were placed in identical 
larger bags. Identical boxes of the Ziploc bags were found near 
both marijuana seizures (T. 144-45)- Additionally, the ledger 
book contained notations indicating that defendant iiai been 
selling one pound amounts of marijuana to "Gil" (T. 189). 
After his arrest in Utah County, defendant returned to Las 
Vegas, Nevada, where he was residing with his girlfriend, Vickie 
Tooke, and Gil Marchbanks. He returned to Utah about a week 
later, approximately four days before the execution of the search 
warrant in Wasatch County (T. 294-95, 280, 282). There is no 
went to the cabin two or three weeks later, around the end of 
March or beginning of April, and retrieved the Jet Ski (T. 273-
276). This would have been at the same time period that Tom 
Otero testified the road to the cabin was impassable. 
2
 On January 25, 1990, prior to trial in the instant case, 
defendant pled guilty in Utah County to a single count of 
distribution of marijuana relating to the April 29th sale of 
drugs to Bryant Collard (R. 188-90). Contrary to the assertion 
in defendant's brief, direct evidence of the plea and conviction 
were never admitted into evidence in this trial. 
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dispute that defendant was not at the cabin at the time of the 
search. 
When Vickie Tooke was subsequently told by her lawyer that 
thirty-six (36) pounds of marijuana had been discovered by the 
police on May 11th at the Timberlakes cabin, she became very 
upset and confronted defendant. She asked defendant where "the 
pot was coming from." Defendant told her that on April 29th# the 
day of his arrest in Utah County, he had picked up the marijuana 
from an individual known as Reuben Martinez in the Park City area 
(T. 226-27; Exhibit 39 at 6; Exhibit 40 at 1-2).3 
Other facts will be discussed in the body of t.his brief as 
pertinent to the individual argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Based on the facts of this case, the trial court properly 
admitted evidence of defendant's prior arrest for purposes of 
establishing defendant's plan, preparation, knowledge and 
identity as the constructive possessor of the marijuana in 
question. Under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, the prior 
bad acts of defendant were factually probative of a contested 
issue; and, under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, this 
probativeness was not substantially outweighed by the prejudicial 
impact of the evidence. Further, the admission of the 404(b) 
3
 Vickie Tooke attempted to recant this statement at trial (T. 
200). She was impeached with her prior written and taped 
statements to the police (T« 203, 206, 217, 225-26). A more 
complete discussion of Tooke's testimony will be presented in Point 
V of this brief relating to the admission of exhibits 39 and 40, 
her prior statements. 
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evidence did not violate defendant's fifth amendments rights 
under either the doctrine of collateral estoppel or double 
jeopardy. 
Because the state established some evidence of each element 
of the crimes charged, the trial court properly denied 
defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. 
Defendant failed to establish any legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the third-party's cabin which was searched. The trial 
court, therefore, properly found that defendant lacked standing 
to contest the validity of the search warrant. Even if defendant 
had standing, the trial court correctly concluded that a 
substantial basis existed to support the magistrate's 
determination that probable cause existed for the issuance of the 
warrant. 
Pursuant to rule 801(d)(1), the trial court properly allowed 
a witness to be impeached with her prior inconsistent statements. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED, PURSUANT TO RULES 
403 AND 404(B), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, FACTS OF 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ARREST TO ESTABLISH HIS KNOWLEDGE, 
PLAN, PREPARATION AND IDENTITY. 
Defendant moved in limine to exclude, pursuant to rule 609, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, the fact of defendant's conviction for 
distribution of a controlled substance arising out of his April 
29, 1989, arrest in Utah County, and to exclude, pursuant to rule 
404, Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence seized during that arrest, 
specifically his ledger and notebook evidencing drug transactions 
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(R. 105-10). In reply, the state argued that the facts of 
defendant's possession of marijuana twelve days prior the instant 
offense was probative of defendant's intent, plan, preparation, 
knowledge and identity as the constructive possessor of the 
marijuana in the cabin (R. 125-32). Based on rule 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence, the trial court found the evidence of 
defendant's prior possession of marijuana was probative of his 
identity as the person having constructive possession of the 
questioned marijuana and probative of his intent, plan and 
preparation in possessing the marijuana (T. 13-14). As such, the 
court correctly applied the balancing test of rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, and found the evidence admissible (T. 11-12, 
14-15). 
Defendant now claims that the court improperly focused on 
rule 609 and commingled it with considerations of rules 403 and 
404 (Br. of App. at 12). This is an incorrect reading of the 
record. The trial court clearly and primarily considered the 
admission of the evidence found during defendant's arrest on 
April 29th under rule 404(b) (T. 3-15; R. 106-10, 125-32). The 
issue was whether the state could introduce the circumstances and 
evidence of defendant's arrest in its case-in-chief (T. 7-9). 
Only as a secondary consideration did the court consider whether 
or not evidence of defendant's conviction was also admissible as 
impeachment evidence if defendant testified (T. 14-15). In this 
regard, the court noted that since drug convictions are not 
automatically classified as crimes of dishonesty, the conviction 
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itself could only be admissible for impeachment purposes if its 
probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect (T. 13-15). 
See Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1). 
Consistent with this ruling, the jury was never informed 
that defendant had pled guilty or was convicted of the April 29th 
offense. This was clearly recognized by defendant's counsel/ 
When the state rested in its case-in-chief, defense counsel 
informed the court that defendant would not be testifying because 
under the court's ruling, if defendant did testify, the prior 
plea and conviction would be admissible impeachment (T. 271). 
Similarly, when defense counsel moved post-trial for a 
certificate of probable cause, defendant referred to the trial 
court's admission of the prior bad acts evidence only under rules 
403 and 404(b) (T. 3). Thus, while defendant may have initially 
raised an objection to the admission of the evidence under rule 
609, its actual admission at trial was based solely on rule 
404(b) grounds. Under these circumstances, defendant has failed 
to preserve any issue relevant to rule 609. State v. Gentry, 747 
P.2d 1032, 1086 (Utah 1987) ("[t]o preserve for appellate review 
a claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a 
defendant must testify"). 
Turning to consideration of the admission of the evidence in 
the state's case-in-chief under rules 403 and 404(b), the Utah 
Supreme Court has recently clarified that evidentiary rulings are 
A
 Defendant's trial counsel is also his current appellate 
counsel. 
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rulings of law, reviewable on appeal for correctness• State v, 
Ramirez, No. 880425, amended slip op. at 10 n.3 (Utah April 23, 
1991). However, in reviewing such claims, especially those which 
balance the "probativeness of a piece of evidence against its 
potential for unfair prejudice," the appellate courts must "de 
facto grant [the trial court] some discretion, because [the 
appellate court will] reverse only if . . . [the trial court] 
acted unreasonably in striking the balance." j[ci. at 11 n.3. 
Similarly, the trial court's subsidiary factual determinations 
will be given deference by the appellate court and should only be 
overruled when clearly erroneous. .Id.. Even when evidence is 
found to be improperly admitted, reversal is only mandated where 
the admission of the evidence constituted prejudicial error. 
State v, Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989); State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 
at 1035. 
Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion. State v. Jamison, 767 
P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Accord United States v. Day, 
591 F.2d 861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Evidence of prior acts is 
admissible if relevant to prove an element of the crime, unless 
under rule 403, the evidence's probative value is "substantially 
outweighed'1 by its prejudicial effect, id.; State v. Wareham, 
772 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah 1989). See also Bovce, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, 85 Utah L. Rev. 63, 84 (1985). But within the general 
rule, the Utah appellate courts have scrutinized rule 404(b) 
admissions for their potential prejudicial effect. State v. 
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Rocco, 795 P.2d 1116, 1118-19 (Utah 1990) (harmless error to 
admit prior and subsequent bad acts that were not probative of 
any issue; no error to admit prior bad acts "reflective of the 
absence of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, or identity"); State v. Gotschall, 
782 P.2d 459, 462-63 (Utah 1989) (no error to admit evidence of 
another crime to show defendant's state of mind and dispute 
defendant's claim of self-defense); State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 
452, 456-57 (Utah 1989) (evidence of other crime admissible to 
prove element of crime but error to admit in guilt phase); State 
v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 427-428 (Utah 1989) (harmless error 
to admit evidence of other crimes where only minimally probative 
of intent); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1141-42 (Utah 1989) 
(harmless error to admit theft crime under rule 609(a), Utah 
Rules of Evidence; but, no error to admit evidence of other 
crimes under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence); State v. 
Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988) (evidence of other 
crimes admissible to establish defendant's intent); State v. 
Morrell, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 27-28 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 30, 
1990) (other crimes evidence admissible to prove a contested 
material element such as intent); State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d at 
137 (evidence of other crimes admissible to show opportunity and 
knowledge of technique used to commit crime). 
In this regard, it is important to recognize what defendant 
is not claiming. Defendant is not contending that any of the 
facts introduced into evidence were unreliable or contested. 
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Defendant stood convicted of the offense of distribution by his 
plea of guilty. Nor does defendant assert that the trial court 
misconstrued the legal requisites for admitting evidence under 
rules 403 and 404(b). Defendant does not even really argue that 
the court improperly balanced the evidence's probative value with 
its prejudicial effect. Instead, defendant asserts that the 
evidence from the prior arrest lacked any probative value and for 
that reason should not have been characterized as 404(b) evidence 
in the first place (Br. of App. at 19-20). Defendant improperly 
asserts that "[t]he only purpose of the evidence [was] to 
persuade the jury that the [d]efendant was a drug dealer of long 
duration and therefore must have been the person who possessed 
the marijuana in the Timberlakes cabin in Wasatch County" (Br. of 
App. at 20). Thus, defendant's argument is not with the trial 
court's ultimate legal conclusion that, applying the balancing 
test of rule 403, the evidence was admissible. Rather, defendant 
is challenging the trial court's initial ruling, under rule 
404(b), that the evidence was factually probative to the 
resolution of the issues in the case, that is, that the evidence 
was factually "relevant." See Utah R. Evid. 402 ("'Relevant 
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence."). 
Because defendant was not the title owner of the Timberlakes 
cabin and was not present when the marijuana was found, the state 
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was required to prove defendant's constructive possession of the 
drugs through circumstantial evidence. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 
127, 132 (Utah 1987); State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318-19 (Utah 
1985); State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981). Even if 
the jury believed that defendant knowingly had access to the 
marijuana in the cabin, it was still necessary for the state to 
prove that defendant had the "intent to make use of that 
knowledge and ability.1' Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. For, the state 
had the burden of establishing that "there was a sufficient nexus 
between the accused and the drug to permit an inference that the 
accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion 
and control over the drug." Id. 
Here, the presence of cash receipts in defendant's name for 
furniture and gas purchases for the cabin, the presence of 
defendant's hunting license, the presence of defendant's 
snowmobiles in the cabin, and the storage of his Jet Ski in the 
cabin all inferentially established defendant's access to and 
control of the cabin. This evidence was further supported by the 
testimony of Tom Otero and Vickie Tooke. However, the state's 
evidence did not establish that defendant had exclusive control 
over the cabin or fully establish his knowledge and intent of the 
marijuana concealed there. The facts and circumstances of 
defendant's possession of substantial amounts of similarly 
packaged marijuana only twelve days prior to the discovery of 
marijuana in the cabin were highly probative of this issue. 
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The state did not argue that because defendant was illegally 
distributing marijuana on April 29th that the jury could infer 
his guilt in the instant offense. Just the opposite. At the 
state's request, a cautionary instruction was given to the jury 
which read: 
During this trial, evidence has been received that 
the Defendant was engaged in other crimes, wrongs or 
acts in connection with his arrest in Provo, Utah on 
April 29, 1989. Under the Rules of Evidence of the 
State of Utah, you are instructed and cautioned that 
such evidence is not to be considered by you for the 
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity 
therewith in connection with the incident which is the 
subject matter of this trial. 
However, such evidence is admissible and may be 
considered by you for other purposes, including proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
(R. 159). During the state's closing argument, the* prosecutor 
reminded the jury that they could not "consider [the other crimes 
evidence] to show acting and conformity [sic] but there is a lot 
of reasons why in this case it is relevant. It shows conduct 
that is relevant to motive, to plan, to operation[,] to his 
identity as being in fact the one who constructively possessed 
the [m]arijuana in that cabin" (T. 305). 
The probativeness of the evidence of defendant's arrest was 
derived from the facts that: 
1. Within a twelve day period, defendant was found in 
possession of fourteen pounds of marijuana and another 
thirty-six pounds were found in a cabin to which he had 
access and at which he stored personal items; 
2. In both cases, the marijuana was packaged in one 
pound packages contained in two gallon Ziploc bags and 
placed in identical larger storage bags; 
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3. In both cases, identical boxes of the two gallon 
Ziploc bags were found with the marijuana; 
4. At the time of his arrest, defendant was trailing a 
Jet Ski which had been stored at the cabin until just 
shortly before defendant's arrest; 
5. The ledger book and large amount of cash in small 
bills found in defendant's truck when he was arrested 
on April 29th, established that defendant was involved 
in the distribution of marijuana in amounts consistent 
with a need to store thirty-six pounds of marijuana 
while delivering another fourteen pounds; 
6. The ledger book also listed "Gil" as a pound 
customer of defendant's, which was probative of whether 
Gil Marchbanks, the title owner of the cabin, would 
have been storing large amounts of marijuana in the 
cabin and yet purchasing pound amounts from defendant. 
Certainly, drug packaging and distribution are not necessarily 
singular type crimes. But the combined similarities, 
together with their reasonable inferences, created circumstantial 
evidence relevant to the jury's determination of the identity of 
defendant as the person having constructive possession of the 
marijuana in the cabin. State v. Rocco, 795 P.2d at 1119; State 
v. Morrell, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28; State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 
1301, 1309 (Utah 1986). 
In addition to the evidence of his arrest, defendant also 
asserts that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence, 
pursuant to rule 404(b), Vickie Tooke's interviews with the 
police and defendant's prior conviction for distribution (Br. of 
App. at 19). This is incorrect. As discussed above, defendant's 
conviction was never admitted into evidence.5 Further, Vickie 
Tooke's statements were not admitted under rule 404(b), but as 
5
 See page 12 of this brief for discussion. 
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prior inconsistent statements under rule 801(d)(1), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (T. 201-04, 255). The propriety of that admission will 
be discussed under Point V of this brief* 
POINT II 
THE COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
WHERE THE STATE PRESENTED SOME EVIDENCE OF EACH ELEMENT 
OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 
At the end of the state's case-in-chief, defendant moved for 
a dismissal, claiming that the state had failed to establish any 
evidence that defendant had constructive possession of the drugs 
found in the Timberlakes cabin (T. 256-60). The motion was 
denied (T. 271). Contrary to the assertion in his brief, 
defendant did not renew the motion at the end of the case (T. 
300-01; R. 168-69). Rather, the court took under advisement 
defendant's motion to dismiss but only as to defendant's claim of 
double jeopardy and collateral estoppel (T. 329, 329; R. 170). 
This was subsequently denied (R. 191-93). 
On appeal, defendant does not claim that the evidence, taken 
as a whole, is insufficient to support his convictions. Instead, 
he limits his argument to a claim of error based on the court's 
denial of his mid-trial motion to dismiss for insufficient 
evidence. In the context of this case, defendant's argument is 
simply that the state failed to make out a prima facie case in 
its case-in-chief. 
In reviewing a prima facie claim, the trial court's denial 
must be upheld "if, upon reviewing the evidence and all 
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the appellate 
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court] concludefs] that some evidence exists from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Dibello, 780 
P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). 
Here, defendant makes no claim that the court improperly 
construed the elements of either the crime of possession with 
intent to distribute or of possession of marijuana without a tax 
stamp affixed. Certainly, there can be no serious dispute that 
possession of thirty-six pounds of marijuana, packaged in one 
pound amounts, evidences an intent to distribute or that the 
requisite tax stamps were not affixed to the marijuana. Nor does 
defendant contend that a person must be physically on the 
premises to show that person's possession. 
The dispute was simply who had committed the crime, i.e., 
who had knowledge, control and an intent to distribute the 
marijuana found in the cabin. Aside from the rule 404(b) 
evidence discussed in Point I, Vickie Tooke testified that she 
had told the police that defendant admitted that he got the 
marijuana in the cabin from Reuben Martinez. While Ms. Tooke 
attempted to recant the voluntariness of her prior statement, the 
legitimacy of her disclaimer was a credibility issue for the jury 
to resolve. State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Based on the evidence presented in the state's case-in-
chief, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
dismiss for insufficient evidence. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d at 
1225. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT DEFENDANT HAD 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HE HAD A LEGITIMATE 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE TIMBERLAKES CABIN SUCH 
THAT HE LACKED STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE SEARCH 
WARRANT; AND, EVEN IF DEFENDANT HAD STANDING, THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS 
EXISTED TO SUPPORT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT 
FOR THE TIMBERLAKES CABIN. 
It is axiomatic that "[t]he proponent of a motion to 
suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or 
seizure." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 130, 131 n.l (1978). 
Constitutional protections against unlawful search and seizure 
are personal rights such that 
[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and 
seizure only through the introduction of damaging 
evidence secured by a search of a third person's 
premises or property has not had any of his Fourth 
Amendment rights infringed. 
Id. at 135 (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 
(1969)). Utah appellate courts have recognized this same 
prerequisite to suppression. State v. Constantinor 732 P.2d 125, 
126-27 (Utah 1987); State v. lacono, 725 P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah 
1986); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 73 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 
53 (1989); State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
Here, defendant challenged the search warrant executed on 
the cabin of a third party, Gil Marchbanks. In his memorandum in 
support of his motion to suppress, defendant alleged that he had 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the Timberlakes cabin 
"because he had supplied labor and materials in the construction 
of the cabin on the property and also enjoyed the use of the 
premises from time to time" (R. 74). The state challenged 
defendant's claim of standing (R. 43-47, 89-94). 
During the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, 
defendant called three witnesses, none of which asserted that 
defendant had any proprietary, possessory or permissive use of 
the cabin (S.T. 2-18). The state moved the court to take 
judicial notice of a civil forfeiture action for the cabin in 
which defendant filed an affidavit asserting that he was not the 
title owner. The affidavit stated that the only interest that 
defendant had in the property was as a contractor and that he had 
occasionally used the premises (R. 67-68). 
Based on this evidence, the trial court properly concluded 
that defendant had failed to establish any legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the cabin at the time of the search (R. 99-101). 
As such, defendant lacked standing to challenge the warrant. 
Accord United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1980) 
(overruling automatic standing doctrine); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. at 426 (passenger of a vehicle lacked standing to challenge 
the automobile's search); State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d at 126-
27 (defendant failed to establish standing where he presented no 
evidence as to his permissive use of another's vehicle); State v. 
Iacono, 725 P.2d at 1377 (defendant lacked standing where he 
presented no evidence as to his ownership, permissive use or 
possession of his mother's trailer); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d at 
1335 (defendant who denied any interest in the vehicle searched 
lacked standing); State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441, 443 (Utah 1978) 
(possession of stolen property alone is insufficient to confer 
standing); State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d at 73-74 (no standing where 
vehicle and gun searched and seized were registered to 
defendant's girlfriend); State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d at 196 
(officer's subjective belief as to defendant's permissive use of 
vehicle irrelevant to determination of standing where only 
evidence was that defendant was a passenger). See also Barrett 
v. State, 105 Nev. 361, 775 P.2d 1276, 1277 (1989) (periodic 
presence in an apartment of another, even when coupled with a 
single monetary contribution for "expenses", does not confer 
standing to object to search of the apartment generally). 
Even if this Court were to consider the merits of 
defendant's claim, the affidavit in support of the search warrant 
for the Timberlakes cabin was sufficient to support the 
magistrate's finding of probable cause. 
The Utah appellate courts have clearly recognized: 
Both the Utah Constitution, article I, section 14, and 
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
require that issuance of search warrants be based upon 
'probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.' 
Whether an affidavit for a search warrant meets the 
probable-cause standard is determined by the 'totality 
of the circumstances' analysis of Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213 (1983). In a line of cases beginning with 
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the Gates standard. Factors to 
be considered include, among others, the veracity, 
reliability, and basis of knowledge of confidential 
informants, and whether the judicial officer issuing 
the warrant reached a practical, common sense decision. 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987). The weight 
accorded these factors may vary according to the 
circumstances. State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 
1984). 
State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1109-10 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (1989). Accord State v. Babbell, 770 
P.2d 987, 990-91 (Utah 1989); State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 
1365 (Utah Ct. App.)/ cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1985). 
In reviewing an affidavit, an appellate court is not to 
conduct a de novo proceeding. State v. Collard, No. 900246-CA, 
slip op. at 3 (Utah Ct. App. April 22, 1991) (citing Rakas v. 
Illinois, 462 U.S. at 236, and State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d at 
991). Rather, the issue is whether the affidavit, taken as a 
whole, provides a substantial basis for the lower court's finding 
of probable cause. Id..; State v. Stromberg, 783 P. 2d 54, 57 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). To preserve the integrity of the warrant, 
deference should be given to the trial court's probable cause 
ruling. Id. 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, the affidavit in the 
instant case is clearly sufficient. When taken as a whole, the 
affidavit established that defendant had been arrested on April 
29th in Utah County with fourteen (14) pounds of marijuana and 
$25,000.00 in cash in small bills (R. 54-55). On the same day, 
defendant's home in Provo was searched and evidence of marijuana 
and paraphernalia for its distribution were found (T. 54-55). 
Defendant's live-in girlfriend, Vickie Tooke, told the police 
that defendant was spending substantially more money than he 
earned legitimately (T. 54). Another individual arrested the 
same day told the police that he had been given his marijuana by 
defendant (T. 55). One week after defendant's arrest, the police 
received an unsigned letter asserting that defendant had a cabin 
in the Heber, Utah area (T. 55). Two days later, a relative of 
defendant's called the police to tell them that defendant had 
requested the relative to go to a cabin in the Heber area and 
retrieve a large amount of cash accumulated from the illegal 
distribution of drugs (T. 55). The relative told the police that 
the cabin was not titled in defendant's name (T. 55). This 
information was consistent with documents found in the search of 
defendant's Provo home on April 29th which indicated that 
defendant had paid the property taxes for a cabin in the 
Timberlakes development, east of Heber. A subsequent records 
search established that the same cabin was titled in the name of 
Gil Marchbanks, a known associate of defendant's (T. 55). 
Instead of focusing on the totality of these facts, 
defendant dissects each paragraph of the affidavit, reading each 
in isolation and artificially. For example, defendant complains 
that the statement that defendant possessed $25,000.00 in cash at 
the time of his arrest is insufficient because it does not 
specify if the money was on his person or in his truck (Br. of 
App. at 31). Such "a grudging or negative attitude . . . is 
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for 
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." State v. Collard, 
slip op. at 3 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236). 
Defendant also argues that one paragraph of the affidavit, 
paragraph 11, contains a false statement such that the paragraph 
should be disregarded (Br. of App. at 33-34).6 However, 
6
 Paragraph 11 reads: 
That a review of financial records seized from the 
residence owned by Rex Paul Taylor at the time of his 
arrest on April 29, 1989 show that Rex has been paying 
the property taxes on lot #1723 at Timber Lake 
Subdivision, plot 16 east of Heber in Wasatch County. 
(R. 73). During the subsequent evidentiary hearing, a police 
officer testified that he found a property tax receipt for the 
cabin in defendant's name (S.T. 9-10). However, the records of the 
deputy assessor for Wasatch County did not show any payments from 
defendant never made this argument to the trial court and has, 
therefore, waived the issue. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 
(Utah 1985). 
But, even if the issue had been preserved, defendant 
misconstrues the Franks v. Delaware7 doctrine. A court need not 
disregard every statement in an affidavit which is subsequently 
proven to be false. Rather, such statements may be disregarded 
when a defendant establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the false and material statement was made intentionally and 
knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth. State v. 
Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1366-67 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 
P.2d 1277 (1987), (citing State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 
1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987)). Even on appeal, 
defendant has made no such allegation. 
POINT IV 
THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 404(B), UTAH RULES 
OF EVIDENCE, IS NOT BARRED BY THE FIFTH AMENDMENT UNDER 
EITHER THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY. 
Defendant contends that the admission of evidence derived 
from his prior arrest violated the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel and placed him twice in jeopardy for the same crime.8 
Significantly, defendant does not assert that the state was 
barred from prosecuting him for both the Utah and Wasatch County 
offenses or that the two offenses were part of a single criminal 
defendant (T. 17-18). At trial, Vickie Tooke testified that she 
paid several bills for the cabin (T. 199). 
7
 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). 
8
 Defendant has only raised this issue based on federal law 
and has not argued for a separate state constitutional analysis. 
episode as defined under Utah Code Ann, § 76-1-403 (1990). Both 
below and on appeal, defendant has consistently argued that it is 
the state's use of the evidence derived from the April 29th 
incident which is precluded by federal due process, but not the 
prosecutions or convictions themselves (R. 185-86; T. 15; Br. of 
App. at 39). Defendant, therefore, presents the limited issue of 
whether the fifth amendment restricts the use of otherwise 
admissible rule 404(b) evidence.9 
In rejecting defendant's argument, the trial court properly 
relied on Dowlina v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 668, 672-73 (1990), 
in which the United States Supreme Court squarely held that 
neither double jeopardy nor collateral estoppel barred the use of 
rule 404(b) evidence. Dowling was acquitted of the home robbery 
of Ms. Vera Henry. Subsequently, Dowling was charged with 
federal bank robbery arising out of a separate incident. 
Pursuant to rule 404(b), Federal Rules of Evidence, the 
government called Ms. Henry to testify as to defendant's use of a 
mask and specific type of weapon in the acquitted robbery for 
purposes of his identification in the second robbery. In 
affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court sspecifically rejected 
the argument now made by defendant and held: 
[W]e decline to extend Ashe v. Swenson, [397 U.S. 436 
(1970)] and the collateral estoppel component of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause to exclude in all circumstances, 
9
 Because defendant concedes that the state was free to 
prosecute defendant separately for both the Utah and Wasatch 
County offenses, this case does not present the situation 
considered in Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2087 (1990), 
relating to when successive prosecutions are permissible 
predicated on the "same conduct." Compare United States v* 
Felix, 926 F.2d 1522 (10th Cir. 1991), with United States v. 
Punqitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
as Dowling would have it, relevant and probative 
evidence that is otherwise admissible under the Rules 
of Evidence simply because it relates to alleged 
criminal conduct for which a defendant has been 
acquitted. 
Dowling, 110 S.Ct. at 672. 
The Court concluded that Ashe and the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel only prevent the government from relitigating facts 
previously determined adversely to it. Therefore, if the prior 
fact finder has not found a specific fact in favor of defendant, 
the government can use that evidence in a subsequent prosecution. 
Id. 
Here, none of the evidence surrounding the April 29th 
offense was previously determined in defendant's favor. Indeed, 
he voluntarily pled guilty to distributing drugs on that date. 
Nor was his possession of the marijuana, money or ledger book in 
dispute. As such, the reliability of evidence sought to be 
admitted was not contested, only its probativeness. Consistent 
with Dowling, the state was not, therefore, collaterally estopped 
from using the verified evidence of defendant's prior criminal 
acts to bolster its identification of defendant as the 
perpetrator of a subsequent crime. .Id., at 673 n.3. 
PCINT V 
DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE FULL BENEFITS OF HIS PLEA 
BARGAIN IN UTAH COUNTY. 
Defendant argues that the "effect" of his entering into a 
plea bargain for the April 29th offenses in Utah County was that 
he "would not have any additional criminal responsibility for the 
conduct which was part of the plea agreement and negotiation" 
(Br. of App. at 39). As previously noted, defendant does not 
claim that the plea bargain in any way precluded the Wasatch 
County prosecution. Nor does defendant claim that the 
prosecutors for either county misrepresented the terms of the 
plea bargain or failed to abide by any of its specific terms. 
Instead, defendant asserts the unique argument that when the 
state enters into a plea bargainf "implicitly" the state agrees 
that evidence from any of the other crimes will never be used 
against the defendant in any other proceeding. Logically, 
defendant is asserting that the state would be allowed to use 
prior evidence and convictions if they resulted from trial 
convictions but is precluded when such incidents result in 
bargained for guilty pleas. 
Defendant attempts to support this argument with citations 
to cases imposing an obligation on a prosecutor to fulfill any 
promises made to secure a plea (Br. of App. at 39). Certainly, 
this is true. But here, the record of the Utah County plea 
contains no representations concerning the pending Wasatch 
action. The only representation was that the Utah County 
prosecutor would dismiss the other Utah County charges, which was 
done (R. 188-90). 
Defendant and his counsel were fully aware at the time of 
the plea that the Wasatch County charges were being actively 
pursued. Despite this, defendant chose to enter into a plea 
bargain only with Utah County. His explicit choice of this 
course of action cannot now be used to create an implicit 
obligation on the state. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE PRIOR 
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS OF A WITNESS UNDER RULE 
801(d)(1), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
As has been discussed throughout this brief, Vickie Tooke# 
defendant's live-in girlfriend, gave several statements to the 
police beginning on the day of defendant's arrest in Utah County 
and continuing into May, 1989. These statements confirmed that 
defendant was a drug dealer who had received marijuana from 
Reuben Martinez on April 29th, some of which was found in 
defendant's possession in Utah County and some of which was found 
in the Timberlakes cabin in Wasatch County. 
Originally, defendant listed Vickie Tooke as an alibi 
witness (R. 23). However, at trial, the state called her as a 
witness (T.196-7). Ms. Tooke testified with her counsel present 
(T. 196). Because of her reluctance to provide information on 
behalf of the state, her continuing involvement with defendant 
and their ongoing relationship as parents of a child, Ms. Tooke 
was declared to be a hostile witness (T. 202-04). Under 
questioning by the prosecutor, Ms. Tooke attempted to recant her 
previous inculpatory statements concerning defendant by claiming 
that she had been "coerced and tortured" by the police to provide 
the information (T. 206, 209). Contrary to her prior statements, 
she denied that defendant told her that he had gotten the 
marijuana from Reuben Martinez or that he knew anything about the 
marijuana found in the cabin (T. 200). She claimed that she had 
made up this information to satisfy the police (T. 206, 209, 217-
19). In this context, the state impeached her testimony with her 
prior written and taped statements to the police (T. 201-210, T. 
221-28). 
Initially, defendant objected to the form of the questions 
during the impeachment (T. 202-03). Defendant then argued that 
prior inconsistent statements of a witness are hearsay and not 
admissible unless against the declarant's interest (T. 204). The 
trial court correctly overruled the objection and allowed Ms. 
Tooke to be impeached with her prior inconsistent statements (T. 
205). See Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1). 
At the termination of the state's case, the prosecutor moved 
for the admission of the state exhibits (T. 246-55.). In relation 
to exhibit 39, Tooke's prior signed statement to the police, and 
exhibit 40, Tooke's transcribed prior taped statement to the 
police, the following exchange took place: 
MR. ESPLIN: Object to both of those exhibits on the 
grounds that they constitute hearsay, irrelevant to 
this case. That they were made at the time when the 
witness who made the statements in her testimony here 
is that she was under duress at that time. Therefore 
and that the information contained in those exhibits is 
not true. 
THE COURT: I don't know what else is contained in that 
exhibit? 
MS. HUFNAGEL: If there is any extraneous matters those 
can be masked but insofar as they pertain. 
THE COURT: Insofar as they pertain to those specific 
areas in which the witnesses were questioned I will 
receive them. 
(T. 255). Defendant then proceeded to put on his case. No 
further discussion of the exhibits took place. Defendant was 
subsequently convicted. Sentencing occurred on August 31, 1990 
(R. 222-23). 
On September 12, 1990, during a hearing on defendant's post-
conviction motion for issuance of a certificate of probable 
cause, defendant for the first time objected to the form of 
submitted exhibits 39 and 40. Defense counsel stated: 
I think particularly, the Appellant [sic] Court will be 
quite interested in the evidence that goes, I think, 
far afield of what is admissible in introducing general 
statements of a witness that was available to the jury 
to read in full* It was not masked, even though there 
was at least one statement, by the prosecutor, that 
could be masked to reflect against violations of the 
rule. It was not. 
(Probable Cause Hearing Transcript, hereafter referred to as 
PC.T., at 7). The state responded that defendant never requested 
any specific masking or redaction of the statements (PC.T. 9). 
Defendant never further responded to the state's assertion that 
he had waived the issue (PC.T. 10-12). 
On appeal, defendant contends that the admission of the 
statements violated rules 801(d)(1) and 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (Br. of App. at 43-44). As to rule 801, even defendant 
now concedes that the statements were generally admissible as 
prior inconsistent statements (Br. of App. at 43). However, 
defendant complains that parts of the exhibits were beyond the 
scope of the impeachment. While the state recognizes that 
exhibits 39 and 40 contain extraneous materials, the trial court 
and the trial prosecutor both informed defendant that these 
materials could be masked (T. 255). Any error thereafter was 
invited by defendant's failure to review the documents and 
request their masking or other editing. A defendant cannot 
invite or compound error and then complain on appeal. State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989); State v. Pacheco, 778 P.2d 
26, 30 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 
112, 121 (5th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 981 (1974). As 
to defendant's argument under rule 404(b), this was never raised 
below other than in general terms of irrelevancy (T. 202-04). 
As such, it has been waived. Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions for 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and for failure 
to have a tax stamp affixed should be affirmed. 
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